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Abstract 
Background.  A common strategy in interviewing is to repeatedly focus on the same topics, 
for example by asking to recall an event first in chronological order and then in reverse order. 
We examined the effect of changing interviewers between the two questions or keeping the 
same interviewers throughout on cues to deception. Truth tellers may be most encouraged to 
recall again what they have witnessed when confronted with new interviewers, as these new 
interviewers have not heard their story before. Liars may be most encouraged to recall again 
their story when confronted with the same interviewers, realising that these interviewers will 
check for consistency in their answers. The impact of changing interviewers should lead to 
more pronounced differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of detail and repetition 
in the ‘Changed Interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition.  
Method. Participants were interviewed by two interviewers about a mock security meeting 
they attended. In half the interviews the same two interviewers remained throughout, and in 
the other half two new interviewers took over half-way through.  
Results. As predicted, differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of detail and 
repetition were most pronounced in the ‘Changed Interviewers’ condition. 
Conclusions. Changing interviewers during an interview effectively differentiates liars and 
truth tellers with respect to detail and repetition. We discuss this finding and its place within 
investigative interviewing and deception detection literature.   
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 ‘We’ll take it from here’: the effect of changing interviewers in information gathering 
interviews 
A common strategy employed by investigators is to repeatedly focus on the same 
topics throughout an investigative interview (Fisher, 2010). This technique is aimed at giving 
interviewees the chance to say everything they know, and to ensure that nothing is missed. 
One way to achieve this is by asking the same question in a different format, for example, by 
asking an interviewee to recall an event in reverse chronological order (Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992). Although the invitation to recall an event in reverse order is mostly used in interviews 
with collective witnesses (Fisher, 2010), it has also been used when interviewing suspects 
(Geiselman, 2012). In the present experiment we also used this reverse order recall in 
interviews with (mock) suspects. We were particularly interested to know whether using 
different interviewers in different stages of an interview can heighten the verbal differences 
between truth tellers and liars. We looked at the effect of (i) having the same interviewers ask 
both a normal chronological order question at Stage One and a reverse order question at 
Stage Two (‘Same Interviewers’ condition) and (ii) changing interviewers after Stage One so 
that the interviewers who ask the normal order question at Stage One are different from the 
interviewers who ask the reverse order question at Stage Two (‘Changed Interviewers’ 
condition).  
For truth tellers, the reverse order question at Stage Two of the interview and the 
introduction of new interviewers at Stage Two may elicit new information. Anderson and 
Pichert (1978) showed that recalling an event from a different perspective stimulates an 
interviewee to think again, subsequently evoking new information. Similarly, recalling an 
event in reverse order in the presence of two new interviewers may encourage an interviewee 
to think harder about the event in question. For liars, the reverse order question or the 
introduction of new interviewers is less likely to result in new information. Liars may find it 
difficult to come up with new information that sounds plausible (Köhnken, 1996, 2004; Leal, 
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Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, in press). Equally, liars may be discouraged from being 
detailed as this increases the risk of that information being falsified (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007; Masip & Ces, 2011; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012, 2013). Therefore, 
methods that can evoke new information from truth tellers (reverse order recall or the 
introduction of new interviewers) may not have such an effect on liars. We thus predicted that 
at Stage Two truth tellers would provide more new details than liars (Hypothesis 1a). We 
further predicted that truth tellers would provide more new details at Stage Two than liars, 
particularly when confronted with new interviewers (Hypothesis 1b).  
Apart from providing new information at Stage Two, we were interested in the 
amount of detail provided during the interview and the amount of repetition in answers 
between Stages One and Two. Having the same or new interviewers at Stage Two may have 
opposite effects on truth tellers and liars, notably in terms of detail at Stage Two and the 
amount of repetition between Stages One and Two responses. Truth tellers will realise that 
the new interviewers have not heard what they said at Stage One. Therefore, they may be 
encouraged to be detailed at Stage Two and to repeat what they have said previously when 
new interviewers are present. Of course, a good reason for truth tellers to be detailed at Stage 
Two and to repeat themselves when the same interviewers are present is to show consistency 
in their answers. Consistency is widely seen as a sign of honesty (Strömwall, Granhag, & 
Hartwig, 2004). However, because truth tellers typically take their credibility for granted 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998) and have no reason to believe 
that interviewers will doubt them, they are typically not concerned with conveying their 
honesty (Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Given that the same interviewers have 
already heard their story, and given that reverse order recall is cognitively demanding, truth 
tellers may be less motivated to tell them the entire story again. 
In contrast, liars may be particularly keen to be detailed at Stage Two and to repeat 
what they have said before when interviewed by the same interviewers. Unlike truth tellers, 
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liars do not take their credibility for granted. Also, given that consistency is perceived as a 
sign of honesty, they may be keen to show consistency in their answers when the same 
interviewers are present, resulting in them being detailed at Stage Two and repeating what 
they have said at Stage One. When two new interviewers take over the interview, the idea 
that their answers will be compared is less obvious (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011). 
This notion, combined with the difficulty of reverse order recall, may result in liars providing 
a shorter statement that includes less detail when two new interviewers are present.  
We therefore predicted that, because liars may find it difficult to fabricate information 
or may fear that their responses will be falsified, overall truth tellers will be more detailed 
than liars (Hypothesis 2a). We further predicted that truth tellers will be more detailed in the 
‘Changed Interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition, whereas 
liars will be less detailed in the ‘Changed Interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘Same 
Interviewers’ condition.  As a result, differences in detail between truth tellers and liars will 
be more pronounced in the ‘Changed Interviewers’ condition than in the ‘Same Interviewers’ 
condition (Hypothesis 2b). We finally predicted that truth tellers will repeat more at Stage 
Two what they have said at Stage One in the ‘Changed Interviewers’ condition compared to 
the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition, and conversely, that liars will show less repetition in the 
‘Changed Interviewers’ condition compared to the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition. As a 
result, differences in repetition between truth tellers and liars will be more pronounced in the 
‘Changed Interviewers’ condition than in the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition (Hypothesis 3).  
The idea that liars display less repetition than truth tellers when the questions are 
asked by different interviewers has been noted twice before (Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann, & 
Hillman, in press; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011). On both occasions, the authors 
speculated that the change of interviewer may have been responsible for the reduced overlap 
in liars’ (compared to truth tellers’) responses. In this article we put this suggestion to an 
empirical test.  
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Method  
Design  
We used a 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Interviewer: same interviewers vs changed 
interviewers) between-subjects design with the following dependent variables: (i) the number 
of  details in Stage One recollections; (ii) the number of  details in Stage Two recollections; 
(iii) the frequency of ‘meeting events’ (see below) recalled in Stage One recollections; (iv) 
the frequency of meeting events recalled in Stage Two recollections; and (v) the amount of 
repetition between Stage One and Stage Two recollections. 
Participants 
A total of 165 participants (58 males and 107 females) took part in the study. The 
sample was made up of undergraduate students (N = 144), university staff (N = 18), and 
members of the general public (N = 3). The average age was M = 22.56 years (SD = 6.64). 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via posters, leaflets, and online advertisements on the 
University’s staff and student portals. An advert was also placed in a local newspaper. 
Participants were invited to play the role of a secret agent, attending a meeting and then an 
interview. The advert provided contact details and offered a £5 reward to those who were 
convincing in the interview.  
After arriving at the Department, participants were informed that they were going to 
play the role of an intelligence officer, attending a secret security meeting. The participants 
were then directed to a small room where the meeting took place. 
The meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to vote on a suitable location to plant a 
spy device, and included a visual presentation of the following details: the three members 
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(confederates) present at the meeting; the spy device and its physical and technical features; 
and the shortlisted locations suitable to host the device, including floor plans and details on 
suitability. Before the third and final location (a hotel reception) was presented, the meeting 
was interrupted, triggering a vote on which location should host the device. The outcome of 
this vote was pre-determined, and the participant’s vote could not affect the result. The 
participant then returned to the room where s/he started the experiment. It was at this stage 
that all participants were randomly assigned to a veracity condition, either truth tellers (N = 
82) or liars (N = 83). 
Prior to being interviewed, the truth tellers were informed that a sister organisation, 
HMR, was aware of the meeting they had just attended. Truth tellers were told that HMR 
knew the target and have been pursuing this person for some time. Truth tellers were 
therefore instructed to have an interview with HMR and volunteer information about its 
content. They were told that their task is to fully cooperate with the interviewers and to 
volunteer all the information they ask for. In addition, the experimenter informed truth tellers 
that they would receive £5 as a reward if they managed to convince the interviewers. 
Alternatively, if they failed to convince the interviewers, they would have to write a report 
about the meeting instead. (All participants in this experiment, truth tellers and liars, received 
the £5 for taking part, and no one had to write a report). Finally, before being led to the 
interview room, truth tellers completed a ‘Pre-Interview Questionnaire’ which measured how 
motivated they were to perform well in the interview. This was measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from [1] ‘Not at all motivated’ to [5] ‘Very motivated’.   
On returning from the meeting, the liars were first informed that a foreign intelligence 
agency, ‘EFA’, was aware of the meeting they had attended. To prevent an investigation into 
HMI, liars were told that they must now meet with EFA and do their utmost to convince the 
EFA interviewers that they are telling the truth. The liars’ task required them to provide a 
mixture of truthful and false information. The truthful information, it was argued, would help 
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convince EFA that they are being cooperative. Therefore, liars were first instructed to be 
completely honest about the room where the meeting took place, and the location that did not 
win the vote. Second, they were told that they must be completely dishonest about the 
location that did win the vote. In all cases, liars were instructed to say that the Hotel 
Reception was the location selected to host the device, and make up the following details: a 
floor plan, one reason why it is a suitable location, and one reason why it is not. Finally, liars 
were told that EFA knew something about the spy device and who attended the meeting, 
though it’s not clear what they knew. As a result, to appear cooperative, liars’ third task was 
to provide a mixture of truthful and false information about the device, and the people present 
at the meeting. How much truthful and false information provided was at the discretion of the 
participant. Liars also received the same information as truth tellers regarding the reward for 
being convincing and the penalty of being unconvincing and completed the same ‘Pre-
Interview Questionnaire’.  Liars were then left alone and given as much time as they needed 
to think about the details of the Hotel Reception. They were not provided with any writing 
materials during this time. Also, the time (in seconds) that liars took to consider what they 
would say about the Hotel Reception was recorded by the experimenter (M = 264.63, SD = 
149.01, ranging between 70 and 900 seconds). 
The Interview. Our interview protocol consisted of two interviewers. A two 
interviewer protocol is frequently adopted by the police (Driskell, Blickensderfer, & Salas, 
2013; Sim & Lamb, 2012) and intelligence agencies (Soufan, 2011), and thus reflects real 
life. We used four interviewers, all female, aged between 31-54. The interviewers had not 
been formally trained in investigative interviewing, but had extensive experience 
interviewing participants in previous experiments. All interviewers were also blind to the 
experimental hypotheses.  Before the interview commenced, the speaking interviewer 
introduced herself and the silent interviewer, stressing that the silent interviewer has been 
trained to detect deception in interviews. The interviewee was also informed that the 
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interviewers knew that s/he had attended the meeting with HMI, and that the purpose of the 
meeting was to select a location to host a spy device.  
The interview schedule consisted of two stages. Stage One required participants to 
recall what happened during the meeting in normal chronological order, and Stage Two 
required participants to recall the meeting in reverse order. Participants also responded to 
questions about the meeting room, the device, the locations, and the confederates present at 
the meeting. While participants’ responses to these questions were also transcribed and 
coded, the results are beyond the scope of the present article, and the data is not included in 
our analyses.  
We implemented our ‘Interviewer’ manipulation immediately after participants had 
answered questions in Stage One. In the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition, a confederate entered 
the room and passed a note to the speaking interviewer. The confederate then exited the 
room, and both interviewers read the note without revealing its contents to the interviewee. In 
the ‘Changed Interviewers’ condition, two new interviewers (one silent and one speaking) 
entered the room. Following the exchange of a note between the new and existing speaking 
interviewers, the existing pair of interviewers exited the room and were replaced by the new 
pair.  Participants were not given an indication as to why the interviewers changed. The 
speaking interviewer from the new pair introduced herself and the new silent interviewer, 
explaining that they would be conducting the interview henceforth. Stage Two commenced 
after the interviewers had changed.  
All participants then completed a ‘Post Interview Questionnaire’, in which they 
estimated the likelihood that they would receive the £5 (measured on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from [1] ‘Not at all likely’ to [7] ‘Very likely), and the likelihood that they would 
have to write a statement (measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from [1] ‘Not at all 
likely’ to [7] ‘Very likely).  
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The questionnaire also examined what the participants could remember about the 
device, the locations, and the confederates. Knowing participants’ actual memory of the 
meeting allowed us to determine exactly how much accurate information was volunteered by 
each participant. After completing the questionnaire, the participants were debriefed and 
received £5 for taking part.  
Counterbalancing. We counterbalanced the locations presented in the meeting, the location 
that was voted for in the meeting, and the interviewers used in the interviews.  
Coding 
Overview.  We coded the amount of detail conveyed in Stage One and Stage Two and 
we did this both subjectively and objectively. We also looked at the amount of repetition 
between Stage One and Stage Two responses, and for any new information provided at Stage 
Two that was not provided at Stage One, again coded subjectively and objectively.  
 Subjective Detail. The interviews were videotaped, audiotaped and transcribed, and 
the subjective ratings of detail were derived from the transcripts. A coder blind to the 
hypotheses and experimental conditions rated participants’ responses using a 7-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (low on valuable detail) to 7 (high on valuable detail). The responses were not 
coded, however, according to the accuracy of the details provided. The amount of valuable 
detail was determined by the degree to which the participant went into detail about events or 
topics they introduced. For example, the sentence ‘The meeting started with some 
introductions, then I saw the device, then we looked at some locations, then we had a vote, 
and then I left’ would be rated as low on valuable detail, as topics are introduced without 
further description. In contrast, the sentence ‘The meeting started with Mr. Black introducing 
himself, saying that he was the operations manager and that he had worked at the company 
for 7 years’ offers a much more detailed account of individual topics, and therefore would 
have been rated high on valuable detail.  
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A second coder also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions coded for 
the same details using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability 
between the two coders for the Stage One (Intra-class Correlation Coefficient, ICC = .93) and 
Stage Two details (ICC = .86) was very high.  
Subjective Repetition. To determine the amount of repetition between participants’ 
responses, again using the transcripts, Stage Two answers were compared with Stage One 
answers. A coder blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions compared participants’ 
responses, rating them using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (low in repetition) to 7 (high in 
repetition). A response would be rated as high in repetition if much of the detail mentioned in 
Stage One recollections were repeated in Stage Two recollections, and no contradictions 
emerged between the Stage One and Stage Two recollections. It should be noted, however, 
that contradictions rarely occurred. Only eight contradictions were noted in the 165 
transcripts by the objective coder. A similar measure of overlap was used by Vrij et al. 
(2009). A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions, also coded 
for overlap using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability between the 
two coders (ICC = .60) was satisfactory. 
Subjective New Information. To determine the amount of new valuable detail in 
participants’ Stage Two responses, Stage Two answers were compared with Stage One 
answers. A coder blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions compared participants’ 
responses, rating them using a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (low in new information) to 7 
(high in new information). A response would be rated high in new information if the 
participant introduced new information, and subsequently went into detail about the new 
event of topic. Therefore, the coding of new information was identical to the coding of detail, 
except that it only applied to new information. A second coder also blind to the hypotheses 
and experimental conditions coded for the same details using a sub sample of 42 transcripts 
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(25%). The inter-rater reliability between the two coders for new information (Intra-class 
Correlation Coefficient, ICC = .92) was very high.  
Objective Detail. The verbal coding was also derived from the transcripts. A coder 
blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions read each answer carefully and marked 
every detail the interviewee gave. A second coder also blind to the hypotheses and 
experimental conditions coded for details using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The 
inter-rater reliability between the two coders for the Stage One (Intra-class Correlation 
Coefficient, ICC = .98) and Stage Two details (ICC = .97) was very high.  
Meeting Events.  We further compiled a checklist of, in our view, 18 key events of 
the meeting. This checklist was used to create the objective overlap variable, discussed 
below. A coder blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions scored participants’ 
responses using this checklist. Participants could score a maximum of 18 points if they 
mentioned all events on the checklist, and they scored 0 points if none of the details they 
mentioned were on the checklist. To demonstrate how the checklist works, item 16 on the 
checklist was: ‘All members casted their votes by a show of hands for each location’. In order 
to score a point for each item, the participant must clearly make a reference to that event. If a 
participant’s response did not have a clear meaning, then s/he did not score a point for that 
particular item. The complete checklist of key events coded is included in Appendix 1.  
A second coder also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions coded 
participants’ responses using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability 
between the two coders for the Stage One (ICC = .99) and Stage Two (ICC= .98) checklist 
scores was high. The ‘total detail’ and ‘checklist’ variables were significantly correlated with 
each other in both Stage One, r(165) = .69, p < .001, and Stage Two, r(165) = .60, p < .001.  
Objective Repetition. To calculate the overlap score, a coder blind to the hypotheses 
and experimental conditions compared the checklist scores from the Stage One and Stage 
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Two responses. Each event that the participant mentioned in both responses counted towards 
their overall repetition score. The overlap score could range from 0 to 18. From that score 
deducted were the few contradictions that occurred in the transcripts. 
A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions, coded 
participants’ responses using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability 
between the two coders for repetition (ICC = .92) was high.  
Objective New Information. To calculate the new information score, a coder blind to 
the hypotheses and experimental conditions compared the checklist scores from the Stage 
One and Stage Two responses. Each event that the participant mentioned in Stage Two but 
not in Stage One counted towards their new information score.  The new information score 
could range from 0 to 18.  
A second coder also blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions coded 
participants’ responses using a sub sample of 42 transcripts (25%). The inter-rater reliability 
between the two coders for new information (ICC = .96) was high.  
Correlations between Subjective and Objective Codings. The correlation between 
subjective and objective detail coding was very satisfactory, r = .67 for Stage One detail and 
r = .67 for Stage Two detail. The correlation between subjective new information and 
objective new information was also satisfactory, r = .55. The correlation between subjective 
and objective repetition coding was lower, r = .44, but it should be noted that the subjective 
and objective repetition coding measured slightly different things. Subjective repetition 
measures the repetition between the statements as a whole, whereas objective repetition 
measures repetition between mentioning key events of the meeting only. 
Results 
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Motivation, Incentive and Penalty. Participants were motivated to do well in the 
experiment ([M = 4.33, SD = .69] on a 5-point Likert scale), with 43% reporting that they 
were ‘quite motivated’ (score of 4), and 44% ‘very motivated’ (score of 5). A 2 (Veracity) X 
2 (Interviewers) ANOVA with motivation as the dependent variable revealed no significant 
main or interaction effects (all Fs <.77, all ps >.380) indicating that participants’ motivation 
level was similar amongst the experimental conditions.  
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANOVA regarding the likelihood of receiving the 
£5 reward resulted in a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 161) = 41.85, p <.001, η2 = .21, d = 
1.01. Truth tellers (M = 4.83, SD = 1.33) more than liars (M = 3.40, SD = 1.51) were inclined 
to think that they would receive a £5 incentive. The Interviewers main effect and the Veracity 
X Interviewers interaction effect were not significant, both Fs <.3.71, both ps >.056.  
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANOVA regarding the likelihood of having to write 
a report resulted in a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 161) = 42.94, p <.001, η2 = .21, d = 1.04. 
Liars (M = 4.52, SD = 1.62) more than truth tellers (M = 3.03, SD = 1.23) were inclined to 
think that they would be requested to write an essay. The Interviewer main effect and the 
Veracity X Interviewers interaction effect were not significant, both Fs <2.15, both ps >.144. 
Taken together, the above analyses suggest that participants were motivated to be convincing 
and that the incentive and penalty appeared realistic.  
Meeting Recollections. Three 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANOVAs examining 
participants’ post interview recollections of the device, the locations, and the confederates 
resulted in no significant main or interaction effects (all Fs <1.51, all ps >.221), indicating 
that participants’ memory of the meeting was similar amongst the experimental conditions. 
The lack of an ‘Interviewers’ effect (or interaction) suggests that any differences in detail 
reported during the interview reflect the strategies employed by truth tellers and liars. 
Participants correctly recalled 84.75% of the device characteristics, 86.50% of the locations 
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characteristics and 67.44% of the confederate’s characteristics. This represents a satisfactory 
memory of the meeting.  
Hypothesis Testing 
New Information. A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANCOVA with participants’ 
additions at Stage Two (new information) as the dependent variable (subjective coding) and 
the Stage One subjective details score as covariate
1
 revealed a significant main effect for 
Veracity, F (1, 160) = 12.62, p  = .001, η2 = .07, d = .42. Truth tellers (M = 2.38, SD = 1.30) 
gave more new information than liars (M = 1.90, SD = 1.00), supporting Hypothesis 1a. The 
Interviewers main effect, F (1, 160) = 1.45, p = .23, η2 = .009, and the Veracity X 
Interviewers interaction effect, F (1, 160) = 2.93, p = .089, η2 = .02, were not significant. The 
absence of an interaction-effect means that Hypothesis 1b was not supported.  
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewer) ANCOVA with participants’ objective new 
information at Stage Two as the dependent variable and the Stage One objective details score 
as covariate revealed a significant main effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 4.06, p  = .045, η2 = 
.025, d = .08. Truth tellers (M = 2.46, SD 2.28) had more new information than liars (M = 
2.28, SD = 2.01), supporting Hypothesis 1a. The Interviewer main effect, F (1, 160) = .20, p 
= .660, η2 = .001, and the Veracity X Interviewer interaction effect, F (1, 160) = 0.01, p = 
.926, η2 < .001, were not significant. The absence of an interaction-effect means that 
Hypothesis 1b was not supported.  
Detail. A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewers) ANCOVA with the Stage Two subjective 
details as dependent variable was carried out. Since the Stage Two subjective detail are 
linked with the Stage One subjective detail (we compare Stage One and Stage Two detail 
within the same interviewee) we introduced subjective detail at Stage One as covariate 
(which was significant, F (1, 160) = 35.87, p <.001, η2 = .18).2 The analysis revealed a main 
effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 13.90, p <.001, η2 = .08, d = .68. Truth tellers (M = 4.45, SD 
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= 1.28) provided significantly more detailed responses than liars (M = 3.63, SD = 1.13), 
supporting Hypothesis 2a. The Interviewers main effect was not significant, F (1, 160) = .51, 
p = .475, η2 = <.01, but the Veracity X Interviewers interaction effect was, F (1, 160) = 7.83, 
p = .006, η2 = .05.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Figure 1 shows that truth tellers gave more detail in the ‘Changed Interviewers’ 
condition than in the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition, whereas liars gave less detail in the 
‘Changed Interviewers’ condition than in the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition. In the ‘Same 
Interviewers’ condition, truth tellers (M = 4.17, SD = 1.10) and liars were equally detailed (M 
= 3.84, SD = 1.21), F (1, 82) = .37, p = .548, η2 <.01, d = .29 In the ‘Changed Interviewers’ 
condition, truth tellers (M = 4.75, SD = 1.39) were more detailed than liars (M = 3.40, SD = 
1.01), F (1, 77) = 19.27, p <.001, η2 = .20, d = 1.11. This supports Hypothesis 2b. 
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewer) ANCOVA was conducted with the objective details 
variable from Stage Two as dependent variable and the Stage One objective details as 
covariate. The analysis revealed a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 21.13, p <.001, η2 = 
.12, d = .97. Truth tellers (M = 28.91, SD = 12.06) provided significantly more detailed 
responses that liars (M = 19.00, SD = 7.87). The Interviewer main effect was not significant, 
F (1, 160) = .68, p = .410, η2 = .004, but the Veracity X Interviewer interaction effect was, F 
(1, 160) = 5.49, p = .020, η2 = .03. In the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition truth tellers (M = 
27.29, SD = 10.85) and liars (M = 19.63, SD = 8.09) gave a similar amount of detail, F (1, 82) 
= 2.66, p = .107, η2 = .03, d =.80. In the ‘Changed Interviewers’ condition, truth tellers (M = 
30.63, SD = 13.13) gave significantly more details than liars (M = 18.33, SD = 7.67), F (1, 
77) = 20.69, p <.001, η2 = .21, d = 1.14. This supports Hypothesis 2b. 
Repetition. Next we analysed the repeated information data. A 2 (Veracity) X 2 
(Interviewers) ANCOVA with participants’ subjective repetition scores as the dependent 
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variable and the Stage One subjective details score as covariate (which was significant, F (1, 
160) = 117.56, p <.001, η2 = .42)3. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for 
Veracity, F (1, 160) = 6.41, p  = .012, η2 = .04, d = .55. Truth tellers (M = 3.76, SD 1.39) 
showed more repetition than liars (M = 3.06, SD = 1.13). The Interviewers main effect, F (1, 
160) = .01, p = .926, η2 < .001 was not significant, but the Veracity X Interviewers 
interaction effect was, F (1, 160) = 6.33, p = .013, η2 = .04.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 shows that truth tellers showed more repetition in the ‘Changed Interviewers’ 
condition than in the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition, whereas liars showed less repetition in 
the ‘Changed Interviewers’ condition than in the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition. In the ‘Same 
Interviewers’ condition, truth tellers’ (M = 3.57, SD = 1.25) and liars’ (M = 3.30, SD = 1.28) 
repetition did not differ from each other, F (1, 82) = .01, p = .920, η2 < .01, d =.21. In the 
‘Changed Interviewers’ condition, truth tellers repeated themselves more (M = 3.95, SD = 
1.52) than liars (M = 2.80, SD = .88), F (1, 77) = 13.62, p <.001, η2 = .15, d =.93. This 
supports Hypothesis 3. 
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interviewer) ANCOVA with participants’ objective repetition 
scores as dependent variable and the Stage One objective detail as covariate revealed a main 
effect for Veracity, F (1, 160) = 10.79, p =.001, η2 = .06, d = 0.80. Truth tellers repeated 
themselves more (M = 8.26, SD = 3.52) than liars (M = 5.81, SD = 2.62). The main effect for 
Interviewer was not significant, F (1, 160) = .01, p = .910, η2 <.001, but the Veracity X 
Interviewer interaction effect was, F (1, 160) = 8.61, p = .004, η2 = .05. In the ‘Same 
Interviewers’ condition, truth tellers (M = 7.86, SD = 3.54) and liars (M = 6.35, SD = 2.84) 
did not differ in terms of repetition, F (1, 82) = .009, p = .924, η2 < .001.  In the ‘Changed 
Interviewers’, truth tellers repeated themselves more (M = 8.78, SD = 3.43) than liars (M = 
5.33, SD = 2.32), F (1, 77) = 21.88, p <.001, η2 = .22, d = 1.17. This supports Hypothesis 3. 
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Discussion 
In the present experiment truth tellers and liars were first asked to recall an event in 
chronological order (Stage One) and then in reverse order (Stage Two). We examined the 
effect of changing interviewers between the two stages or keeping the same interviewers 
throughout on cues to deceit (level of detail, new information, and repetition in answers).  
The ‘Changed interviewers’ condition was more successful in eliciting cues to deceit 
than the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition. When the same interviewers were present throughout 
the interview, no differences emerged between truth tellers and liars in terms of the amount of 
detail in Stage Two, and the amount of repetition between Stages One and Two. In contrast, 
when confronted with new interviewers at Stage Two truth tellers were more detailed in 
Stage Two than liars, and their answers in Stages One and Two showed more repetition than 
the answers given by liars. 
Truth tellers were more detailed in recalling again what they have witnessed when 
confronted with new interviewers than when confronted with the same interviewers. The new 
interviewers had not heard their story before, which may have encouraged the truth tellers to 
say more.  In contrast, liars were less detailed in telling their story again when confronted 
with new interviewers than when confronted with the same interviewers. To convey honesty, 
liars may wish to produce consistent responses, but the need to do this may be less when 
confronted with new interviewers who have not heard their previous answer than when 
confronted with the same interviewers who have heard their previous answers before.  
The findings that truth tellers and liars showed similar repetition in the ‘Same 
Interviewers’ condition and that liars showed less repetition than truth tellers in the ‘Changed 
Interviewers’ condition, sheds new light on the ongoing debate about whether liars are more 
or less consistent than truth tellers. The idea that liars are less consistent than truth tellers is a 
popular view amongst practitioners (Strömwall, Granhag,  & Hartwig, 2004) and promoted in 
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police manuals (Vrij & Granhag, 2007), but research findings show that liars are not always 
less consistent than truth tellers (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013). In this respect, Granhag and 
colleagues introduced the ‘reconstruct – versus repeat’ hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 
1999, 2001; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003), which states that when asked to report 
information for a second time, truth tellers will search their memory for the original event and 
will reconstruct their story again based on these memoires. In contrast, liars will think about 
what they have said the first time and will try to repeat this information. Repetition may lead 
to the same level or even to more consistency than reconstruction. The present results 
suggests that when confronted with two new interviewers, truth tellers’ tendency to 
‘reconstruct’ and liars’ tendency to ‘repeat’  is weakened. The end result is that truth tellers 
repeat themselves more, and liars repeat themselves less. The notion that liars are likely to be 
less consistent than truth tellers only after a change of format is introduced, was also found 
by Leins, Vrij, & Fisher (2012). In their experiment, truthful participants had visited a room 
whereas deceptive participants had not. However, in the interview all participants claimed to 
have visited the room. Participants were asked to verbally recall the layout of the room twice, 
to sketch it twice, or to verbally recall it once and to sketch it once. Liars contradicted 
themselves more than truth tellers, but only in the ‘verbal recall – drawing’ condition. In 
other words, to find differences in consistency between truth tellers and liars, it may be 
necessary to introduce a change in strategy when asking for the same information, either by 
using different interviewers (the present experiment) or by asking the same question in 
different formats (Leins et al., 2012).  
Our findings suggest that ‘external factors’ (such as changing versus maintaining the 
same interviewers) can have a profound effect on consistency in truth tellers’ and liars’ 
responses. It may well be that truth tellers and liars have different interview strategies which 
are highlighted by external factors. Future research could attempt to shed light on the external 
factors that highlight such strategies. 
19 
One of our hypotheses was not supported. Although truth tellers provided, as 
predicted, more new information at Stage Two than liars did, having the same or new 
interviewers at Stage Two did not affect the amount of new information truth tellers gave. We 
had predicted that truth tellers would give more new information with new interviewers, 
because we expected that this change in interviewers would stimulate them to search their 
memory more for detail. We can only speculate why the predicted effect did not occur. The 
request to report the event in reverse order already triggered truth tellers to provide new 
information and perhaps this task overshadowed the effect that new interviewers may have on 
eliciting new information. 
We are aware that the ‘Same Interviewers’ condition is the standard procedure in the 
Cognitive Interview (CI, Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). We do not suggest that this procedure 
should be changed due to our findings. The reverse order question in the CI is designed to 
elicit new information. The Reverse Order question did elicit new information and this was 
not influenced by the interviewer condition. In the present experiment we were also interested 
in the repetition of information previously reported, something the CI is less concerned 
about. It is in this elicitation of old information where the interviewer condition differentiated 
truth tellers and liars. In other words, if the interviewer has no reason to believe that the 
interviewee is lying, which is often the case in the Cognitive Interview as it is mainly used 
when interviewing cooperative witnesses (Fisher, 2010), only the elicitation of new 
information is relevant and there is therefore no need to change interviewers during the 
interview. 
The present experiment fits well in the new wave of ‘interviewing to detect deception’ 
research aimed at eliciting cues to deceit through specific interventions (Vrij & Granhag, 
2012). Other strategies that have proved effective at eliciting cues to deceit are imposing 
cognitive load on interviewees (Evans, Meissner, Michael, & Brandon, 2013), encouraging 
truth tellers to say more (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, in press), asking 
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unexpected questions (Vrij et al., 2009) and introducing evidence in interviews in a strategic 
manner (Granhag, Strömwall, Willén, & Hartwig, 2013; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Kronkvist, 2006).  
Since truth tellers said more than liars, particularly in the ‘Changed Interviewers’ 
condition, we believe that this manipulation fits particularly well in the ‘encouraging truth 
tellers to say more’ research domain. Encouraging truth tellers to say more has several 
benefits. It addresses the core of investigative interviewing, which is to obtain as much 
information as possible from interviewees (Fisher, 2010). In addition, if truth tellers provide 
lots of information they are more likely to be believed, because the richer an account is 
perceived to be, the more likely it is to be believed (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Johnson, 2006; 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Finally, the additional information truth tellers 
provide could provide leads for investigators to pursue.  
Methods that encourage truth tellers to say more are unlikely to have the same effect 
on liars. First, liars may find it too cognitively demanding to add as many details as truth 
tellers do. Moreover, if liars do add a sufficient amount of detail, the additional information 
may be of lesser quality or may sound less plausible (Leal et al., in press). Finally, liars may 
be reluctant to add more information out of fear that it will provide leads to investigators and, 
consequently, give their lies away (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, in press). 
In conclusion, the present experiment demonstrated the beneficial effect of changing 
interviewers half-way through an interview, notably when interviewers discuss the same 
topics twice over the course of an interview. In their second response, truth tellers provided 
more detail and repeated themselves more compared to liars, but only if the interviewers had 
changed half-way through the interview.  Our findings challenge previous findings (Granhag 
& Strömwall, 1999, 2001; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003) in that truth tellers 
appeared more consistent that liars. The present findings highlight the complex relationship 
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between consistency and deception, suggesting that consistency may depend on both internal 
(retrieval strategies) and external factors (interview setting).  
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Figure 1. Subjective detail at Stage Two as a Function of Veracity and Interviewer. Error bars 
represent confident intervals (95%).  
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Figure 2. Subjective repetition between Stages One and Two as a Function of Veracity and 
Interviewer. Error bars represent confidence intervals (95%).  
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1
 The new information at Stage Two results could have been affected by the Stage 
One subjective details results. For example, if someone was very detailed at Stage One, new 
information at Stage Two is less likely to occur. We therefore introduced subjective details as 
Stage One as a covariate. 
2
 An alternative analysis would be a 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interview) X 2 (Time: Stage 
One versus Stage Two) analysis. The disadvantage of this analysis is that at Stage One the 
‘Same/Changed Interviewers’ manipulation was not yet introduced, whereas the analysis 
treats the Stage One data as if this factor was introduced at Stage One. 
3
 The subjective detail at Stage Two results could have been affected by the Stage One 
subjective details results. For example, those who reported many details at Stage One have a 
greater likelihood to obtain a higher repetition score on Stage Two. We therefore introduced 
subjective details as Stage One as a covariate.  
